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Abstract
Nationalism studies does not seem to be a very innovative field of research. The path-
breaking views of Anderson, Gellner and Hobsbawm – all published in 1983 – still form
the starting point for almost all existing investigations. Moreover, most recent studies
focus on one national case, which implicitly results in a vast collection of ‘unique’
trajectories. However, over the last few years a number of highly original studies on
the origins of nationalism, nation-state formation, banal nationalism, methodological
nationalism and nation-building in a global perspective seem to announce a new
dawn. Some of these refreshing interpretations – which will be discussed in this article
– clearly demonstrate that historiographical nationalism still has a preponderant role in
history writing. In the concluding paragraphs I will emphasize the need to overcome not
only methodological nationalism, but also the terminological and normative nationalism
that still dominates our discipline.
Keywords
Banal nationalism, global perspectives, methodological nationalism, nationalism, nation-
building
It seems that nothing really new has happened with nationalism studies over the
last three decades. The path-breaking works that were published in 1983 – Benedict
Anderson’s Imagined Communities, Ernest Gellner’s Nations and Nationalism and
Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger’s The Invention of Tradition – still provide the
interpretative framework for almost all existing studies. Moreover, over the last
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three decades an enormous amount of case studies have been published that focus
on one national context, so it is difficult to get an overview of the entire field. As a
consequence, the differences between the various national cases have received more
attention than the similarities. Recently, however, a few books have appeared on
the market that not only seriously update the now classic views of these authors,
but can potentially sit alongside them in the pantheon of nationalism studies.
Moreover, they could help us overcome the historiographical nationalism that
still largely dominates our discipline.
Origins
One of the most hotly contested issues related to nationalism concerns its origins.
Most experts subscribe to the modernist view which holds that nations, nation-
states and nationalism are closely related to the rise of modernity and are not
possible before the eighteenth century. The modernist consensus is recapitulated
in The Oxford Handbook of the History of Nationalism, a recent global overview
edited by John Breuilly.1 It starts, unsurprisingly, with a chapter on the intellectual
origins of nationalism focusing on Rousseau’s plea for popular sovereignty and
Herder’s idea that each nation had its own unique culture, while the first territorial
chapters deal with the Wars of Independence in the Americas and the impact of the
French Revolution in Europe. By clustering various neighbouring countries in
regional chapters, it avoids the traditional inward-looking case-study approach
that generally focuses only on those nationalisms that resulted in independent
nation-states. Some authors make use of this comparative approach to test more
general theoretical insights. Thus in his chapter on South-East Asia, David Henley
thoroughly examines why French Indochina was divided into three independent
nation-states, while the Dutch East Indies – which was probably much more
diverse – became a single Indonesian nation-state. According to him, the
memory of the ancient kingdoms that formed the basis for the new states was
still alive in Indochina, whereas major pre-colonial states had disappeared centuries
ago in the Dutch East Indies. The Indonesian nationalists therefore took over the
colonial state instead of creating a national state on the ethnically homogenous
central island of Java. Breuilly himself approaches his chapter on national unifi-
cations in nineteenth-century Europe in an original way by also including the
Polish case. He thus sheds new light on the well-known process of Italian and
German nation-state formation. He even pleads for substituting the finalistic
term ‘unification nationalism’ for ‘pan nationalism’, which aims at uniting all mem-
bers of a supposed nation in one state, but which is not necessarily successful.
The modernist view has been criticized by specialists of early modern history,
who argue that many national identities are already discernible before the late
eighteenth century, while authors such as Anthony Smith have emphasized the
continuity between national and older ethnic identities.2 A forceful attack on the
modernist interpretation has been launched recently by the political scientist Azar
Gat in an ambitious book on the long history and deep roots of political ethnicity
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and nationalism, simply titled Nations.3 Inspired by sociobiological theories, he
argues that human beings have an innate propensity to prefer people of a closer
kin to ‘strangers’. As a consequence, even in the distant past people identified with
members of their own tribe, ethnicity or nation and, if needed, collaborated with
them to expel ‘foreign’ invaders or alien overlords. Since he is a specialist of
military history and has written a similar sweeping overview on warfare, Gat prob-
ably puts too much weight on the rather exceptional state of collective defence
against an external enemy, which almost regardless of the period he interprets as a
proof of nationalism or at least political ethnicity.4 He even argues that Ancient
Egypt already was a nation-state and although he acknowledges the massive trans-
formation that took place with the arrival of modernity, he clearly emphasizes the
continuity between pre-modern and modern forms of nationalism.
Even though Gat’s views have been widely criticized, his book contains a
number of fascinating critiques of the mainstream modernist interpretation.5
Thus, contrary to Anderson, for instance, he claims that the creation of imagined
communities was not only made possible by a process of secularization and the rise
of print capitalism, but could also be produced by the spoken word – for instance
from the pulpit – and via religious rituals. Moreover, religions often propagated the
national idea and churches were generally organized nationally; during the
Reformation era this was obvious for both the Protestant and Catholic Church,
but it also applies to the Orthodox parts of Europe. He further claims that Gellner
and other modernists have focused too much on France as the model of a success-
ful nation-state and on the Habsburg Empire or India as typical multi-national
dynastic empires without a dominant ethnic group. He argues, however, that Spain
and England were much more representative nation-states and unlike France they
did not totally succeed in assimilating the ethnically different periphery: Portugal,
the Basque Country and Catalonia in the case of Spain and Ireland, Scotland and
Wales in Great Britain. Moreover, large Eurasian empires with a strong ethnic core
such as Russia, China and Japan were more common according to the author than
cases such as India or the Habsburg Empire. Although, with his taste for polemics,
Gat probably overstates his argument, historians recently have tried to show in
theoretically well-informed case studies that collective (national) identities already
played a role in the early modern period.6 Nevertheless, without popular sover-
eignty, national citizenship and sharp territorial boundaries, the differences with
modern nationalism and the nation-state remain enormous.
The modernist interpretation of the origins of nationalism is updated in Siniša
Malešević’s handbook Nation-States and Nationalisms: Organization, Ideology and
Solidarity.7 The author combines Gellner’s focus on the role of industrial modern-
ization in requiring mass education in a standard language, Anderson’s emphasis
on cultural factors such as the undermining of royal authority by the growing
impact of secularization and the role of the printing press in diffusing national
standard languages, with more recent views on the impact of state-building.
According to Malešević, the modern, bureaucratic state came into existence in
Europe through a slow process that lasted several centuries. Over time, its potential
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to construct and enlarge the country’s infrastructure grew enormously and it began
to reach deep into the lives of its inhabitants. At the same time, increased literacy,
the growing role of the media and the rise of the public sphere enabled the
ideological mobilization of the masses, and it was nationalism that provided a
highly successful state-centred ideological doctrine that potentially encompassed
all citizens. In order to make the bureaucratic nation-state attractive, fostering
solidarity among the members of the nation became crucial and as a consequence
it was portrayed as a close-knit community. The nation-state finally succeeded
because it resonated in ‘hubs of micro-solidarity’, such as neighbourhoods and
private homes. All this, according to the author, was not possible before the late
eighteenth century. In another recent study, Charles Maier approaches the natio-
nalizing impact of state-building from a slightly different angle by focusing on the
construction of borders, a process that began in seventeenth-century Europe and
increasingly led to the homogenization of both territory and people.8
In 2013, the sociologist Andreas Wimmer also published an ambitious new view
on the rise of nationalism and nation-states based on both quantitative and quali-
tative methods. According to him, nation-states are neither an ideological construct
imposed from above, nor the result of an ‘eternal desire for ethnic self-rule’, but the
result of political modernization. Indirect rule by provincial elites of earlier state
forms was undermined by administrative centralization and the growing clout of
the masses, for instance through new forms of warfare (such as the levée en masse),
increased political awareness or the rise of voluntary organizations. This meant
that dominant elites could no longer depend on their alliances with subordinate
elites, but had to collaborate with at least a part of the masses. Political modern-
ization could have three different outcomes according to Wimmer’s model: (a)
nation-states in which the central elites succeeded in integrating the entire popula-
tion; (b) populist nationalism in which the dominant elite allied with the masses
against a subordinate elite; and (c) ethnic closure, which means that both dominant
elites and subordinate elites allied with their own ethnic constituencies. As a
consequence, populism, large-scale ethnic conflicts and nation-states are all prod-
ucts of modernity. The main factor that determined successful nation-building
was not ethnic homogeneity, but state centralization. In strong centralized states
it was much easier for dominant elites to reach a new exchange relation with the
population at large: taxes and military service in exchange for public goods and
political participation.9
Nevertheless, in Wimmer’s view, it is important to distinguish between the rise
of the first national communities – in France, the United States and Britain –
during the late eighteenth century and the dissemination of the nation-state
model to the rest of the world during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
Since the new nation-states were militarily and politically more powerful, political
leaders elsewhere began to adopt the model in their own territories, while intellec-
tuals began to extol the nation-state as a more legitimate model that would bring
higher rewards to the population at large. Economic, cultural or political modern-
ization, for instance through industrialization, growing literacy rates or state
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centralization, are much less important for explaining the rise of nation-states
elsewhere in the world than the specific power configuration at a given time
and place, even though the route taken could vary from a gradual transition,
revolution, secession, civil war or unification. Nationalists had little chance in
strong and stable empires, while substantial power shifts, wars and the establish-
ment of nation-states in surrounding areas provided opportunities for nation-state
formation.10 Another surprising conclusion of Wimmer’s ground-breaking study is
that, contrary to existing views, wars were more likely to occur during and after the
transition to the nation-state model. His analysis is based on a sophisticated
statistical analysis of new sets of data for both civil and interstate wars during
the last two centuries. Although his social science approach sometimes is quite
abstract and schematic, his book should be a starting point for all scholars who
want to study the rise of nationalism or the relationship between nation-state
formation, ethnic politics and armed conflict.
Nationalism in Everyday Life
Another issue that has attracted sustained scholarly attention is the nation-building
process. Influenced by Eugen Weber’s Peasants into Frenchmen and Eric
Hobsbawm’s concept of ‘invention of tradition’, historians have conducted a
large number of investigations on conscious nation-building activities by national
and regional elites and the invention of specific nationalist traditions such as
national holidays, symbols, flags, commemorations and monuments.11 However,
social scientists have recently begun to pay attention to more mundane forms of
nationalism, which often were not produced consciously by dedicated nationalist
activists, and which are still largely ignored by historians.
Crucial in this sense is Michael Billig’s Banal Nationalism, which was published
in 1995.12 According to Billig, nationalism expresses itself openly not only in wars,
revolutions and national holidays, but also in banal or everyday experiences such
as sport, travel, mass media and at home. According to Billig, the identification
with one’s own nation does not only occur when nationalism is ‘hot’, but also when
it has ‘cooled down’. And this happens on a daily basis in all kinds of ‘trivial’
or ‘banal’ acts, which are probably more pervasive because they pass largely unno-
ticed. When we speak about ‘the government’, ‘the economy’ or ‘the countryside’,
we generally understand that we refer to the government, economy or countryside
of our own country. The identification with ‘our’ soldiers, sportsmen and singers is
taken for granted as a natural phenomenon, as is the division between foreign
and domestic news. In the forecast even the weather seems to abide by national
frontiers. In fact, the nation-state has become internalized as the ‘natural’ unit by
which we divide the world.
Billig’s already classical study and Tim Edensor’s equally influential National
Identity, Popular Culture and Everyday Life have produced a wave of studies on
more mundane forms of nationalism.13 However, most of these studies are con-
ducted by social scientists and focus on very recent periods. A good example
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is Food, National Identity and Nationalism by Atsuko Ichijo and Ronald Ranta,
which shows that even such banal practices as eating and drinking have been
thoroughly influenced by nationalism.14 Through various short case studies they
analyse how individuals, groups, companies, states and international organizations
routinely connect specific food items or cooking practices to specific nations.
Sometimes, this is the consequence of conscious activities by nationalists. Thus,
in the case of Scotland, the authors make clear that from the early nineteenth
century onwards nationalists used to gather on 25 January for a Burns Supper
to celebrate the national poet’s birthday. Toasts, songs and poems were combined
with whisky and ‘national’ dishes such as haggis. Probably more influential in
connecting specific beverages with the nation were the activities of the Scotch
Whisky Association, which – following the example of the French wine growers
– tried to defend its economic interests by defining whisky as indissolubly
connected to the soil and traditions of Scotland.
Today, however, the nationalization of food is primarily driven by commercial
companies, such as those in the (British) catering industry. In order to demonstrate
the ‘authenticity’ of the almost industrially prepared dishes they are presented with
a specific nationality, such as Moroccan tagine, French onion soup or Greek-style
lamb. This also helps to diversify the menu. Moreover, in order to increase the
transparency of the production chain and in many cases also to stimulate sustain-
ability, coffee, tea, chocolate, but also meat, vegetables, fruit and dairy products
are labelled as originating from and belonging to a certain nation or one of its
regions. Probably the most paradoxical outcome of the book is that international
organizations that promote universal values, such as UNESCO, indirectly help to
reify national identities. Thus, the intangible heritage programme that started in
2003 is explicitly meant to protect the world’s cultural diversity. However, since
applications can only be made by member states and the immaterial traditions that
are proposed for inscription in the official list should not be confined to certain
small groups or elites, most gastronomic traditions that have been recognized so far
are national traditions, such as the ‘gastronomic meal’ of the French, Turkish
coffee culture and traditional Mexican cuisine. Thus, UNESCO’s immaterial heri-
tage programme ends up subsuming the local under the national, while supporting
national claims to culinary ownership.
Most social scientists associate banal nationalism with stable, post Second
World War nation-states. Nevertheless, in Nation-States and Nationalisms
Malešević argues that trivial forms of nationalism have played an important role
since its rise in the late eighteenth century. He thus mentions the dress of French
revolutionaries, the Englishness in early nineteenth-century novels and the role of
world fairs in disseminating stereotypical images, products and experiences of
participating nations.15 Historians have not yet paid much attention to these
kinds of topics, although there are a few fascinating exceptions. By focusing on
the nationalist motivations of commercial actors, authors such as Guy, Harp and
Zuelow have shown how champagne became an essentially French beverage, how a
company like Michelin tried to sell more tyres through all kinds of nationalist
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activities and how tourism stimulated Ireland to become more Irish.16 However,
the unintended nationalizing consequences of modernization and standardization
processes, or the banalization of various nationalist symbols and practices are more
difficult to study for historians. Detailed information on the conscious invention of
national traditions is often easily discovered in archives and the contemporary
press. However, it is much more difficult to find primary sources that could shed
light on how certain traditions over time became widely accepted, especially since
for the more distant past we cannot make use of interviews or opinion polls.
Creative solutions are definitely needed. Perhaps humorous texts and pictures
could be an entry into detecting what has only quite recently become accepted as
standard.
Methodological Nationalism
Not only has the impact of nationalism on daily life been much more pervasive
than could be inferred from older studies, but nationalism has also heavily influ-
enced the way scholars have studied human society. Thus, in an article published in
2002, Andreas Wimmer and Nina Glick Schiller had already made clear that the
social sciences take the nation-state for granted and that research is affected in
three different ways by ‘methodological nationalism’. First, classical social theory
downplays the role of nationalism and sees it as something backward, but at
the same time accepts a world divided into nation-states as a given. Second,
sociologists equate society with national society and thus take nation-states as
the ‘naturally given entities of study’. Third, in the social sciences the analytical
focus is reduced to the boundaries of the nation-state and everything that extended
‘over its borders was cut off analytically’. The consequence of this use of the nation-
state as a container in which developments are analysed is that statistics are
routinely gathered for national units, trans-border movements or influences are
ignored and immigration, for instance, is seen as an anomaly that should be
controlled and monitored, while this is not the case for migration flows within
the borders of a nation-state.17
Many of these critiques also apply to the discipline of history and in fact one of
the main conclusions of the European Science Foundation research programme
‘Representations of the Past: The Writing of National Histories in Nineteenth
and Twentieth Century Europe’ is that history writing is largely dominated by
‘historiographical nationalism’. In the final summary of this project, The Past as
History: National Identity and Historical Consciousness in Modern Europe, Stefan
Berger argues that since the early nineteenth century historians have tended
to investigate, narrate and interpret the past through a national lens.18 Without
dealing extensively with the debate on the supposed modernity of nations and
nationalism, Berger shows how from the late Middle Ages onwards references to
peoples or nations became increasingly common in the work of chroniclers and
historians. Nevertheless, nations were defined in a rather vague way, while histor-
ians showed more interest in the role of dynasties or the traces of God’s presence
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in the past. In the early modern period humanists and enlightened scholars in
Western Europe began to produce more secular interpretations in which nations
and even patriotism began to play a role. However, until the eighteenth century,
the histories of cities, dynasties or civilizations were more important than the
supposedly unique trajectory of the different nations.
In the German lands during the Romantic era the discipline of history was
professionalized and institutionalized through the creation of the first university
chairs. The new scientific standards of professional history writing quickly became
the model for the rest of the continent, while conveying an ‘aura of truthfulness’
and ‘scientificity’. Transnational networks of scholars and international confer-
ences played a stimulating role in transferring all kinds of innovations. However,
as a reaction to the enlightened universalism and its forceful promotion by the
French Revolution and Napoleon, German ‘historicism’ clearly prioritized nations
over other territorial units. National history thus became the dominant form of
history writing. Everywhere ‘national master narratives’ were constructed, which in
many ways still dominate present day historiography. In those areas where nations
already had their own state these narratives focused very much on the state, its
primary decision-makers (princes and politicians) and its borderlands. A focus on
the ‘people’ was more important in the case of ‘nations’ that did not yet have a
state. In both cases, there was a lot of attention focused on the origins of the nation
in the mists of time, on the Middle Ages as the crucial period for nation formation,
on the nation’s supposed Golden Age and on the construction of canons of
national heroes (and villains). Regional histories became building blocks of the
national story, while religion and class were increasingly studied within a national
framework.
Thus, historians interpreted the European Wars of Religion not only from an
explicit national perspective, but also from a specific understanding of the collective
personality of the nation. Even eminent historians did not focus on the conflict as a
whole, but on those episodes that took place on the territory of one later nation-
state, its impact on the history of this specific nation and how it was shaped by and
impacted upon the national character that according to these historians was
already in place. Karl Lamprecht, for example, argued that Protestantism contrib-
uted to the arrival of a new age of individualism in Germany.19
The first half of the twentieth century can, according to Berger, be characterized
as the high point of historiographical nationalism. Borderlands were increasingly
contested by historians, who forcefully defended the rights of their own nation.
Some scholars even justified ethnic cleansing and genocide. Only in the 1960s and
70s did new historical trends, such as cultural history and history from below, begin
to move away from the nation as the dominant frame of analysis. Although a more
critical attitude towards national master narratives nowadays seems to have
become common property among professional historians in most parts of
Europe, this is not the case with public history. Thus recent handbooks directed
at a broad audience, such as Heinrich August Winkler’s Germany: The Long Road
West and Norman Davies’s The Isles: A History, still present a rather uncritical
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national narrative.20 Moreover, other recent approaches, such as comparative his-
tory and memory studies, generally still take the nation-state as their basic unit of
analysis. Berger’s admirable tour de force really makes the reader aware of the
profound and lasting impact of historiographical nationalism and the urgency to
rethink the foundations of our discipline.
Some Innovative Interpretations
The implicit consequences and inconsistencies of the current hegemony of the
nation-state model are discussed in Rogers Brubaker’s Grounds for Difference, in
which he reflects on the interconnections between social differences and collective
identities. In most essays, the author first shows the inconsistencies of a specific
influential current-day theory and then comes in with his own perspicacious obser-
vations and counter-arguments. Thus, in the last chapter he takes on Shmuel
Eistenstadt’s theory of multiple modernities. Eisenstadt asserts that currently
there are a number of cultural and political models that do not conform to the
Western standards, and which even tend to become more prominent. By assuming
the existence of multiple modernities, he aims to substitute older modernization
theories that presupposed that the world would converge around a single, Western
model of modernity. Brubaker, however, argues that in order to define societies,
models or ideas as modern – even if there are multiple variants – one needs to have
a clear criterion to define what all forms of modernity share. So paradoxically one
again ends with a single modernity. But Brubaker also disagrees from a more
historical or sociological perspective by focusing on nation-states and nationalism
as central elements in the interpretation of modernity. According to him, the
organizational models and ideas about ‘nation, state, citizenship and popular
sovereignty form a kind of package’, and it was this package as a whole that
was diffused globally, starting with the French Revolution in 1789.21 This does
not mean that we have to adopt an outdated, Eurocentric understanding of the
modern state and of nationalism as purely secular and civic. The nationalist pack-
age has proven to be flexible and adaptable enough to be adopted in many different
circumstances.
In a similar way, Brubaker refutes Charles Tilly’s analysis of social inequality in
Durable Inequality. Whereas Tilly argues that exploitation and social closure – the
exclusion of outsiders from a specific profession or resource – often occurred along
ethnic or gender lines, Brubaker makes clear that they do not depend on categorical
differences. Moreover, by taking the nation-state as his unit of analysis, Tilly and
many other social theorists overlook the main instrument of social closure in the
current meritocratic world: citizenship. According to Brubaker, citizenship ‘is an
inherited privilege (or disability), and one that is transmitted, in turn, to one’s
descendants’.22 It is obvious that social closure based on citizenship in the
modern state system did not cause the vast inequalities between the various coun-
tries, but it serves to perpetuate them. It determines one’s access to education,
health care and other benefits and one’s right to work and to secure residence.
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In another chapter Brubaker deals with the implications of the rise of the nation-
state model during the last two centuries. This model presupposes that the borders
of the state overlap with those of the nation and that a national culture is dominant
within the territory of the state, but stops at its borders. Moreover, all residents
should be citizens and participate in the same national culture. Although probably
not a single state totally conforms to this ideal type, it constitutes the norm and as
such has enormous consequences. The nation-state became a fluid space of internal
geographic and social mobility. This is seen as normal and should be facilitated,
while migration across national borders is considered an anomaly that undermines
‘the cultural homogeneity within states’ and the ‘sharp cultural boundaries between
them’.23 The same is true for the existence of minority groups who formally or
informally are not really part of the nation. This generally results in politics of
belonging, which can have an enormous impact on those who should be included
or excluded, and can even affect those fellow nationals who happen to live outside
of the border. Should a migrant first become a member of the culturally defined
nation before he or she can acquire citizenship? And, to provide a concrete case, do
ethnic Germans from Russia have a greater right to obtain German citizenship
than children of Turkish migrants who have been born and raised in Germany?
Equally lucid is the essay on the ways in which language and religion are inter-
twined with ethnicity and nationhood. Brubaker asserts that in premodern societies
language was a private matter that was of no concern to the state, whereas the
authorities often imposed religious uniformity. In present-day liberal societies, in
turn, religion is a private issue, whereas the state imposes one specific language (or
sometimes allows several) by making it the official medium of communication
which is used in education and by institutions. Moreover, by taking the nation-
state model as the norm, states generally only award official status to those minor-
ity languages that are long established within the country and not to the languages
of immigrant communities. The use of a standard language in the public sphere has
become so pervasive that immigrant communities rapidly adopt the dominant lan-
guage of their place of residence, while the reproduction of minority languages
requires sustained efforts by the state, or the limitation of the language options
for specific parts of the country, as has happened in Belgium, Switzerland and
Spain. This means that languages as Herder’s ‘carriers of distinctive world views’
have lost much of their ‘thickness’ (if that has ever existed at all), since over time all
inhabitants – regardless of their cultural background – are socialized within the
same national language. Religion, on the other hand, is routinely passed on from
one generation to the next, while in most states various religious denominations
have become institutionalized. As a consequence, language has lost most of its
mobilizing potential, while religion, with its comprehensive set of norms, increas-
ingly affects the public realm. Brubaker thus sees a reversal of a long-term trend,
as religion today is more important than language for the ‘political accommodation
of cultural difference in Western liberal democracies’.24
Nationalizing Empires, edited by Stefan Berger and Alexei Miller, aims to rede-
fine the relationship between empires and nation-states, while overcoming the strict
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divide between colonial history and the study of the West.25 Empires and
nation-states have traditionally been seen as opposites by historians. As proof
of the success of Woodrow Wilson’s collating of democracy and national self-
determination, empires were seen as autocratic, feudal and anachronistic.
The Habsburg, Romanov and Ottoman Empires were ‘prisons of nations’, and
their collapse at the end of the First World War was interpreted as the inevitable
outcome of a long process of decline.26 Berger and Miller, however, argue that
during the long nineteenth century most nation-states actually were empires. This
was the case with Great Britain, France, Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands, Belgium
and Denmark. Moreover, new nation-states such as Germany and Italy rapidly
began their own colonial project. In order to be respected, a nation-state needed to
have an (overseas) empire. On the other hand, nationalism also strongly affected
the cores of the continental empires in Eastern Europe. Berger and Miller thus
rightly conclude that most nations emerged within empires, that nation-building
generally happened within an imperial context and that nation-building and empire
were closely entangled.27
The impact of nationalism in the core of ten of these empires is analysed in
individual chapters. Some authors focus more on one aspect – economics and
migration in the case of Austria-Hungary, intellectual history in the case of
Venice/Italy – than others. As the timeframes of these chapters also do not exactly
match, it is difficult to compare the trajectories of each of these empires. However,
by adding five more thematic and comparative chapters by foremost specialists on
imperial history, the final result is a very rich and dense patchwork that explores
new ground.
Almost all the chapters provide fascinating new insights. Thus, Robert Aldrich
makes clear how direct links between, for instance, Brittany, Corsica, Lyon and
Marseille and specific parts of the French colonial empire stimulated the integra-
tion of these regions and cities into the French nation. Xosé-Manuel Núñez Seixas
shows how the loss of the last remnants of Spain’s colonial empire had a contrary
effect in Spain, providing a direct stimulus for Catalan and Basque calls for auton-
omy. Stefan Berger argues that the racialization of national discourse in the
German Empire was related to both the treatment of the Polish and Jewish mino-
rities at home and that of colonial subjects and mixed offspring overseas. Alexei
Miller emphasizes that in the Russian Empire there was not much overlap between
the traditional nation-building policies of the Tsar, focusing on religion and dynas-
tic loyalty, and those of more liberal elites who were in favour of political partici-
pation. In a similar vein, the Ottoman wavering between Ottomanism, Islamism
and Turkism, according to Howard Eisenstat, was the result of a ‘messy process of
experimentation’ rather than a conscious choice for a specific ideology.
The most surprising contributions deal with the Napoleonic Empire and
Denmark. Michael Broers discusses Napoleon’s short-lived empire, showing that
French officers and officials mainly distinguished between civilization and barbar-
ity. The former was associated with those parts of the Empire that accepted the
Code Napoleon, such as the North of France, the Low Countries, the German
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Rhineland and the North of Italy, while the territories and social groups that
persisted in ‘barbarous’ behaviour by rejecting the new regime, and which even
included the West and South of France, were considered subjugated lands where a
civilizing mission was badly needed. National identities, defined by language and
culture, did not yet play a major role.
Uffe Østergård, in turn, shows how the composite Danish state – which in many
ways was comparable to the ‘multi-ethnic’ Habsburg Empire – was dismembered,
not because of the strength of nationalist agitation, but as a consequence of lost
wars (thus implicitly confirming Wimmer’s views). Since Frederick VI remained
faithful to his alliance with Napoleon until the very end, he had to cede Norway to
Sweden in 1814. As a consequence, the dominance of the Nordic part of the popu-
lation in the Empire of the Oldenbourg dynasty became weaker, but even until the
1830s German liberals from Schleswig-Holstein were united with their Danish
counterparts in their opposition to royal absolutism. Only in 1848 did nationalist
tensions between the two main remaining parts of the European core of the Empire
(Denmark also had small colonial outposts in India, Africa and the Caribbean)
increase. However, in 1864, it was the military intervention by Prussia and Austria
that forced Denmark to relinquish its German-speaking territories.
Another volume, titled The Shadow of Colonialism on Europe’s Modern Past and
edited by Róisin Healy and Enrico Dal Lago, approaches the relationship between
nation-states, empire and colonialism by focusing not on the core, but on those
who were the ‘victims’ of imperial expansion within Europe.28 Most chapters deal
with regions such as Ireland, Schleswig, Alsace and the Polish-speaking parts of the
German Empire, the Mezzogiorno in post-unification Italy and the Ukrainian-
speaking parts of Interwar Poland, while determining to what extent the oppression
they suffered can be defined as ‘colonial’. In fact, this is complicated because these
regions were part of nation-states and as a consequence the inhabitants were citi-
zens with voting rights. Nevertheless, the authors – most of whom are connected to
Irish universities – clearly show how nation-building policies were experienced as
enforced assimilation by many inhabitants of peripheral regions. Instead of uniting
the nation, the measures taken by the central government often led to discontent,
active opposition and in some cases even organized resistance, and as a conse-
quence were largely counterproductive.
Nevertheless, using the term ‘colonialism’ instead of ‘imperialism’ becomes quite
confusing, since colonialism is primarily associated with economic exploitation, pol-
itical marginalization and cultural denigration in the oversees colonies of the
European powers. Therefore, most authors conclude that in their case the situation
does not totally fit the classical definition of colonialism. Probably the main excep-
tion was Bosnia-Herzegovina, which came close to being a full-blown colony of the
Austrian Empire. In fact, this edited volume takes the nation-state as standard, even
in a normative sense. Consequently, the authors criticize those instances in which the
nation-state ideals were violated on the ground. This also becomes clear in the nor-
matively charged vocabulary that is used in speaking of ‘imposition’, ‘exploitation’,
‘subjugation’, ‘shadow’ and ‘darkness’. Thus, contrary to Nationalizing Empires,
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this volume does not provide an alternative to the hegemony of the nation-state in
the study of nineteenth- and twentieth-century Europe, but implicitly confirms it.
Consequences and Implications
The books that have been discussed so far not only show us new approaches or
underexplored territories for the study of nationalism, nation-building and nation-
state formation, they should also stimulate us to fundamentally revise our ways of
writing history. First of all, there is still ample work to do for historians interested
in these topics. Although the debate on the supposed modern origins of national-
ism remains heated, dispassionate investigations such as that of Stefan Berger on
history writing or Michael Broers on the Napoleonic era can shed more light on the
transformation in the meanings of the term nation and its importance during the
early modern period. It also seems justified to conclude that Wimmer’s profound
investigations into the global success of the nation-state model deserve to become
the starting point for anyone wishing to examine the coming into existence of a
particular nation-state. Specifically, his somewhat schematic theories and models
will profit from empirical case studies that can validate or fine-tune some of his
conclusions. Another topic that deserves attention is the impact of nationalism on
everyday life, which has not yet been thoroughly researched for the past. Social
scientists have already employed new concepts and approaches, while unearthing
many instances of mundane forms of nationalism in the past. However, by largely
ignoring the temporal dimension, it is not clear when exactly more mundane forms
of nationalism arose and how more obvious forms became banalized over time.29
It has also become clear that the nation-state is not the only possible state form
in the modern world, but a quite specific product of historical developments.
Moreover, it did not become dominant right away. Even in Europe most states
were empires or aspired to become one. This slowly began to change after the First
World War and Wilson’s highly influential plea in favour of the right to national
self-determination, but would only become more effective after the collapse of the
imperial dreams of Nazi Germany and Japan in 1945. Nonetheless, it was only in
the 1960s that most Western powers began to dissolve their colonial empires, while
the Soviet Empire lasted until the early 1990s. Moreover, after 1989 the autono-
mous nation-state was also increasingly weakened by neo-liberal policies, such as
large-scale privatizations and the curtailing of the welfare state, while at the same
time it was eroded from the outside by the globalization of the economy, the rapid
increase of travel, tourism and migration, the growing power of transnational
companies and supranational organizations such as the European Union, and by
the rise of Internet. Thus, one could argue that the nation-state was only truly
hegemonic during a very brief period between the 1960s and the 1980s.
Moreover, nation-states hardly conformed to the ideal type. Healy and Dal
Lago’s volume shows that many nation-states in Europe resorted to forced assimi-
lation, oppression of minorities and sometimes even to population transfers and
ethnic cleansing in order to create the homogeneous nation that the model seemed
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to require. Brubaker even argues that trans-border migration, which has always
been a quite normal phenomenon in human history, in fact contradicts the nation-
state model, since it both undermines the cultural unity of the nation and the sharp
borders between the supposedly unique national cultures. Berger and Miller
add that nation-states and empires were not mutually exclusive and that actually
most European nation-states during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries were
‘nationalizing empires’. It can be assumed that outside of Europe the boundaries
between both were not that sharp either. Even in the colonies nationalizing
tendencies were detectable, for instance when mass media began to construct a
collective ‘national’ identity for each colony, even long before the first movements
of national liberation came into being.
In light of the very brief period in which the nation-state model was truly hege-
monic, it is surprising that nationalism had such a profound and lasting impact on
the social sciences and the discipline of history. From the early nineteenth century
onwards the nation-state became the dominant unit of analysis, which is still very
much the case; and, as Berger and Wimmer and Glick Schiller have made clear,
it will not be an easy task to overcome the existing methodological nationalism.
First of all, education and research is still organized along national lines. National
archives collect primary sources along national lines, while national libraries do the
same for secondary studies. Universities depend largely on the government and
national agencies for their money and research funds. Many chairs in history
departments are still dedicated to national history, while many conferences,
associations and journals still focus on one national context. Maps and catalogues
reproduce a world of bounded nation-states, while history books in libraries and
shops are generally ordered according to the nationality of the topic.
It must be admitted that recently historians (and other scholars within the
humanities and social sciences) have become more critical about the dominant
position of the nation-state and have adapted their research agenda by, for
instance, paying more attention to comparative history, transnational topics, or
by exploring local, regional, imperial or global topics. Nevertheless, most scholars
continue to focus on the local, regional or imperial past of one nation-state, take
nation-states as their basic units for comparison or study the movement of persons,
ideas or goods over national borders.
Historical handbooks – and this is even more the case with books that target a
broad audience – still routinely use nation-states as the main territorial unit to
structure their story and even project nations back into the distant past. Even
the terminology we use is profoundly affected by historiographical nationalism.
Thus, terms used for historical epochs, such as the Victorian era, Vormärz, the
Third Republic, the Antebellum period and the Risorgimento are often derived
from and applicable to one national context only. Moreover, supposed turning
points are different for each national case, which makes comparison even more
difficult. This is even more evident in the use of concepts that only apply to one
national context, such as frontier, Home Rule,Heimat, laicité or kulak. Sometimes,
even comparable political currents or movements receive different labels in each
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national context. Thus, German Sozial-Liberalismus is known as New Liberalism
in Britain, solidarisme in France, regeneracionismo in Spain, the Giolittian Era in
Italy and the Progressive Movement in the United States.
However, it is not just a question of units of analysis and terminology. The
nation-state also provides a normative framework, which is still omnipresent in
the writings of historians and passes largely unacknowledged. It is understandable
that as private individuals we prefer to live in a (democratic) nation-state, however,
as professional historians we should not privilege one state form over another and
treat them on an equal basis and with a neutral tone. Nonetheless, this is generally
not the case. Like Wilson, historians still routinely describe empires as ‘backward’,
while their policies are characterized as ‘foreign conquest’, ‘occupation’, ‘oppres-
sion’ and ‘subordination’, while the creation of nation-states is analysed by using
positive terms like ‘revolution’, ‘unification’, ‘war of independence’, ‘liberation’ or
‘uprising’ (instead of, for instance, rebellion, secession, disruption or usurpation).
Empires are described as ‘multi-ethnic’ or ‘multi-national’, thus implying that their
demise was inevitable. Nation-states, on the other hand, are associated with pro-
gress, equality and self-determination, and cases that do not entirely conform to the
ideal type are characterized as anomalies, such as the presence of ethnic minorities
or immigrants, which have to be dealt with through nation-building or assimilation
policies. Even postmodern and postcolonial concepts, such as ‘cross-cultural’,
‘othering’ or ‘hybrid identities’, presuppose that an independent, unified and homo-
genous nation-state is the norm. Thus, it will not be an easy task to overcome the
methodological, terminological and normative nationalism that still dominates his-
tory writing. In order to succeed, we will have to amend our way of doing research,
revise our vocabulary and rewrite the story of the past in a very thorough way.
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and Nation-States: Beyond the Dichotomy’, Thesis Eleven (2017), 3–10.
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